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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the Court of 
Appeals are set forth in the caption of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioners, LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. and 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION (collectively referred to as 
"Private Ledger") petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to 
review the Memorandum Decision (not for official publication) of 
the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Brcroch v. Harry. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether or not a principal may be held liable for the 
unauthorized acts of an agent on the basis of apparent authority 
where the agent has acted so far out of the scope of the 
authority granted to him that he has been criminally convicted of 
defrauding his principal in that specific transaction. 
Whether or not a principal may be held liable for the 
unauthorized acts of an agent where the plaintiffs have produced 
no credible admissible evidence of reasonable reliance that the 
agent had the apparent authority to conduct the unauthorized act. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
Private Ledger seeks review of the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Brcroch v. Harry, supra [see Appendix, Exhibit 
"A" . ] 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals Opinion was filed on April 18, 1996. 
Private Ledger's Petition for Rehearing was denied on June 18, 
1996. [See Appendix, Exhibit "B"] On July 18, 1996 this Court 
issued an order extending time to file this Writ of Certiorari to 
and including August 19, 1996. [See Appendix, Exhibit "C"] 
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This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Private Ledger seeks review of the Court of 
Appeals Opinion on the following basis: The decision has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Utah Supreme 
Court's power of supervision; the Opinion if allowed to stand 
will establish a disastrous precedent; and the Court of Appeals 
has decided a critical question of state law which has not been, 
should be, settled by the State's highest court. Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 46(a)(3), 46(a)(4) (1994). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure set 
forth the considerations governing the review of this Petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the unauthorized (and criminal) acts of 
an agent which were so far outside the course and scope of the 
authority granted to him by the principal that the trial court 
properly determined, as a matter of law, that the principal was 
not responsible for the acts of the agent. [See Appendix, 
Exhibit uDfl] The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the 
trial court and in so doing, set up an erroneous course in clear 
conflict with federal law and the laws of other jurisdictions, 
and in degradation of sound public policy. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The claims of plaintiffs Frank Brgoch ("Brgoch") and 
Seymour Isaacs ("Isaacs") all arise from an investment each made 
in May 1988 in Red River, an Arizona real estate limited 
partnership. Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were made by 
Defendant Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry"), to whom each plaintiff 
had granted a discretionary power of attorney to make such 
investments. [R. 463-465] 
2. Defendant Harry acted as stock broker for plaintiffs 
Isaacs and Brgoch at various brokerage firms from 1977 through 
1989. [R. 493-498, 499-504] Brgoch and Isaacs were experienced 
investors, who began speculating in the stock market in 1972 and 
who had at least one other broker who they regularly used for 
speculative investments. [R. 636-640] For example, Brgoch 
invested approximately $40,000 in speculative penny stocks over a 
ten year period. [R. 636-640] 
3. Following their respective retirements as airline 
pilots in 1984, Brgoch and Isaacs contend that they specifically 
and continually instructed Harry (years before he had any 
affiliation with Private Ledger) that they wanted no more limited 
partnership investments, no investments which were subject to 
continuing contributions, and no long term investments inasmuch 
as they were both living off their retirement accounts and long 
term investments were of no use to them given their life 
expectancy. [R. 493-504] 
/// 
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4. Harry became a licensed independent contractor 
registered representative of Private Ledger in late December of 
1987, and executed his Registered Representative Agreement on 
January 11, 1988. [R. 523-530] Before joining Private Ledger, 
Harry was with Prudential Bache Securities in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, where both plaintiffs were his clients. In fact, Harry 
joined Private Ledger shortly after his former colleague at 
Prudential Bache, Cregg Cannon ("Cannon"), became a licensed 
independent contractor Registered Representative of Private 
Ledger on November 25, 1987. [R. 564-566, 519] 
5. On or about May 9, 1988, Harry caused $30,600 of 
Brgoch's funds and $31,000 of Isaacs' funds to be invested in Red 
River. [R. 461-465] At the time of those investments, Harry had 
been plaintiffs' stock broker for over ten years, but he had been 
affiliated with Private Ledger for less than five months. 
Plaintiffs' long term relationship was with Harry, not Private 
Ledger. See State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
6. To facilitate the later making of these Red River 
investments, Harry had caused to be transferred by wire transfer 
the necessary funds from plaintiffs' respective accounts at 
Private Ledger to the First National Bank of Onaga, Kansas. 
[R. 463-465] Both plaintiffs admit that their Private Ledger 
statements in May or June of 1988 showed the transfer of funds 
from their accounts to the Kansas bank in accounts in their name. 
[R. 600 (H 3), 605 (H 3)] No mention was ever made of Red River 
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on Private Ledger's records and the transfer of plaintiffs' funds 
to bank accounts in their name in Kansas was entirely proper. 
[R. 567-568] It was after the plaintiffs' funds were in their 
individual accounts in the Kansas bank that the Red River 
investments were made. [R. 463-465, 600, 605] Private Ledger 
had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the Red River 
investments, and plaintiffs have never contended otherwise. 
7. Brgoch and Isaacs contend that Harry did not seek or 
obtain their prior approval to make the investments in Red River 
and that the investments in Red River were, in fact, contrary to 
their prior specific instructions to Harry concerning the types 
of investments they wanted to make following their retirements. 
[R. 436, 441-446, 449-455, 493-504] They do not contend that 
Private Ledger had any knowledge of the Red River investments 
prior to or at the time those investments were made. 
8. In or about July 1988, approximately two months after 
the Red River investments were made, Brgoch and Isaacs each 
received a statement dated June 30, 1988 from the First National 
Bank of Onaga stating funds that had been transferred to the 
First National Bank of Onaga and that these funds had then been 
used to purchase units in Red River. [R. 436, 438, 449-453, 463-
465] . The Kansas bank statements expressly informed plaintiffs 
that their funds had been invested in a limited partnership. 
[R. 463-465] Both Brgoch and Isaacs admit receiving and 
reviewing their statement from the Kansas bank in July 1988. 
[R. 436, 438, 449-453, 463-465, 600 (f 4), 605 {% 4)] 
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9. Following receipt of the June 30, 1988 statement from 
First National Bank of Onaga, Brgoch and Isaacs went to see Harry 
in July 1988 to discuss the meaning of the statement and the 
investment in Red River. [R. 600, 605] 
10. At the meeting and afterwards, neither Brgoch nor 
Isaacs made any effort to investigate the details of their new 
investment. [R. 444, 447] Plaintiffs dealt with Harry, and 
failed to produce any evidence that either of them had ever made 
any attempt to contact anyone at Private Ledger. Plaintiffs' 
failure to make any attempt to contact or complain to anyone at 
Private Ledger after learning of Harry's conduct in July 1988 
further confirms their awareness that Private Ledger had no 
involvement whatsoever with Red River and Harry's activities 
involving Red River. 
11. Private Ledger first learned of Cannon's involvement 
with Red River when Private Ledger received a letter from Scott 
R. Frost of the State of Utah, Department of Business 
Regulations, Securities Division, dated February 3, 1989. [R. 
511, 567] Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly investigated the 
matter and terminated its relationship with Cannon on March 8, 
1989. [R. 512-513, 567-568] Private Ledger was subsequently 
informed that Red River was an Arizona limited partnership and 
that the general partners were Cannon and Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr. 
[R. 567] 
12. Private Ledger did not become of aware of Harry's 
involvement with Red River until November 7, 1989. [R. 568] 
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Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly terminated its relationship 
with Harry on November 15, 1989. [R. 568] 
13. Red River was never approved for sale by Private 
Ledger. [R. 567] Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were not 
made through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never 
appeared on any Private Ledger statements. [R. 567-568] Private 
Ledger received no commissions or fees on the Red River 
transactions. [R. 568] Private Ledger had no prior knowledge 
that Harry had solicited plaintiffs to invest in Red River. 
[R. 568] 
14. At the time Harry became a licensed independent 
contract Registered Representative of Private Ledger, he signed a 
written agreement [R. 523, 564-565], which specifically provided 
that he would only sell securities which had been approved by 
Private Ledger for sale. [R. 525 (H 3A), 564-565] In addition, 
Harry signed a separate memorandum acknowledging Private Ledger's 
strict prohibition [and the prohibition by the National 
Association of Security Dealers ("NASD")] against the 
solicitation and sale of private securities transactions which 
were not approved by Private Ledger, referred to in the 
securities industry as "selling away". [R. 566-567, 508-510] 
Cannon had also executed a similar document. [R. 567-568, 505-
507] 
15. Following their termination by Private Ledger, Cannon 
pled guilty and Harry was later convicted following trial of four 
counts, including committing criminal fraud on Private Ledger in 
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connection with his unauthorized solicitation and sale of 
investments in Red River. [R. 569] Harry's conviction was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [State v. Harry, supra] 
16. Brgoch and Isaacs filed their original Complaint on 
March 17, 1992 naming Harry and Private Ledger as defendants. 
[R. 2-8] Plaintiffs' claims all arise solely from their 
investment in Red River. Despite claims that the Red River 
investments were unauthorized and based on mistake, plaintiffs 
never sued Red River or either of its general partners, or the 
Bank of Onaga. [R. 2-8, 288-302] 
17. On December 31, 1992, plaintiffs filed a First Amended 
Complaint alleging seven causes of action. [R. 288-302] Private 
Ledger was named as a defendant in only the Second Cause of 
Action for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Fourth Cause of 
Action for alleged negligence, the Sixth Cause of action for 
alleged violations under the Utah Uniform Securities' Act. 
18. On March 30, 1994, Private Ledger moved for Summary 
Judgment [R. 405-407] on two grounds: (1) Private Ledger was not 
liable for Harry's actions because Harry acted outside the 
control and scope of authority granted to him by Private Ledger 
for the sale of approved securities; and (2) plaintiffs' claims 
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations because 
plaintiffs were admittedly aware in July of 1988, more than three 
years before they filed this action, that Harry violated their 
express agreement regarding investments. On May 17, 1994, the 
trial court granted Private Ledger's motion on the first ground 
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only, but denied it as to the second ground. [R. 666, 820-822] 
On April 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed [Appendix, 
Exhibit "A"]. Private Ledger moved for rehearing and the Court 
of Appeals ordered plaintiffs to file a response, and then denied 
the petition for rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Of Appeals Decision Is Bad Law And Violative Of 
Sound Public Policy, 
The issue which Petitioner seeks review is of vital 
importance to every employer and principal in the State of Utah. 
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, in reversing the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Private Ledger, 
emphasizes the "general rule that a principal is liable for 
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during 
existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's 
actual or apparent authority" [see Appendix, Exhibit "A", p.l 
(emphasis added)] citing Restatement (Second) of Agency section 
161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16 
(Utah App. 1995); Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus., Inc., 626 
P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). While this general rule of law may 
be correct, it is only the starting point in the analysis of a 
principal's liability for the unauthorized acts of its agent 
under the theory of apparent authority. The Court of Appeals 
Memorandum Decision, however, ends its analysis at this starting 
point. 
Although there are no Utah cases directly on point involving 
securities broker-dealers and "selling away," it is well settled 
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that for a principal to be vicariously liable for the 
unauthorized acts of its agents under a theory of apparent 
authority, the principal must conduct itself in such a way as to 
clothe its agent with the apparent authority to perform the torts 
committed and there must be reasonable reliance on that apparent 
authority on the part of the injured party. Jackson v. Righter, 
891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants); see also Luddington v. 
Bodenvest, Ltd., 855 P.2d 204-209 (Utah 1993); State ex rel. Div. 
of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 
1988). Without conduct on the part of the principal and 
reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, a claim based 
upon apparent authority cannot be maintained. Jackson, supra, 
at 13 91 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals Memorandum 
Decision fails to address these key requirements, stating only 
that question of fact exists over the scope of the agent's 
authority [Appendix, Exhibit "A", p.2] despite a fully developed 
record at the trial court level of the absence of any proof of 
these requirements. 
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision also fails to 
adhere to Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
cases construing that rule. Private Ledger's summary judgment 
motion was made and supported with abundant admissible evidence 
that Harry was not the actual or ostensible agent of Private 
Ledger in connection with his activities with plaintiffs 
involving Red River. Having made that showing, Rule 56(e) then 
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shifted the burden to plaintiffs to prove by admissible evidence 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (e); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, 
Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994); Harline v. Barker, et al., 912 
P.2d 433 1996 Utah LEXIS 11 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs produced no 
such admissible evidence. 
Where an agent's conduct is clearly outside the scope of his 
authority, the issue may be decided as a matter of law. Jackson, 
supra, at 1390; Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 
(Utah 1989). That is precisely what the trial court did in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Private Ledger. 
Under the standard articulated by the Court of Appeals, in 
reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, it will be 
virtually impossible for any employer to ever obtain summary 
judgment despite completely uncontradicted facts and evidence 
that the principal did not clothe the agent with apparent 
authority and that there was no reasonable reliance of apparent 
authority on the part of the plaintiff. 
B. The Court Of Appeals Misconstrued Horrocks. 
As noted above, in its Memorandum Decision, the Court of 
Appeals cites Horrocks for the general rule that "a principal is 
liable for the injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, 
committed during the existence of the agency and within the scope 
of the agent's actual or apparent authority." Horrocks, supra, 
8 92 P.2d at 14-15. However, the Court of Appeals misconstrued 
Horrocks. 
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In discussing apparent authority, the Horrocks court noted 
"the record is replete with facts sufficient to clothe Buchanan 
[the agent] with such apparent authority." Id. at 16. In 
stating that it was reasonable for Horrocks to believe that 
Buchanan was the agent of Westfalia [the principal], the court 
noted that Buchanan had used the principal's documentation to 
obtain the plaintiff's funds, the principal had cashed the 
plaintiffs' check and the principal had provided a form which the 
agent used to deceive the plaintiff. Id. Thus, Horrocks 
expressly recognizes that for apparent authority to exist, (1) 
the principal must clothe the agent with apparent authority and 
(2) there must be reasonable reliance on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
The uncontroverted evidence is that neither of these 
elements was present in this case. Clearly, the Court of Appeals 
misconstrued the holding in Horrocks and this Court should grant 
certiorari in order to clarify this inconsistency. 
C. The Court Of Appeals Decision Is Contrary To The Clearly 
Established Law Of Other Jurisdictions, 
Substantial case law from other jurisdictions supports 
Private Ledger's position that, as a matter of law, a securities 
broker-dealer may not be held liable for the unauthorized 
activities or "selling away" activities of their registered 
representatives. The most recent decision is Bates v. Shearson 
Lehman Bros., Inc., 42 F.3d 79-82 (1st Cir. 1994), and concluded, 
as a matter of law, that a securities broker-dealer had no 
liability to one of its customers who had been defrauded by the 
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clearly unauthorized activity of its registered representatives. 
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision here, albeit an 
unpublished one, is the only authority to the contrary, and does 
not even distinguish or discuss the clearly established law of 
other jurisdictions cited in Private Ledger's Appellate Brief. 
Of particular significance is Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d 
1338 (9th Cir. 1994) where the Ninth Circuit held, as a matter of 
law, that a securities broker-dealer was not liable for the 
"selling away activities" of its registered representatives, 
including a rejection of any alleged liability for ostensible 
agency. In affirming summary judgment, the Hauser court 
concluded: 
Nevertheless, the District Court correctly 
concluded the record left no room for genuine 
issue of fact, because it established that 
the customers could not have believed that 
Rausher/Pierce [the broker-dealer] had 
anything to do with the NTE promotion [the 
subject investment]. Id. at 1343. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court reached a similar decision in 
FSC Securities Corp. v. McCormack, 630 So. 2nd 979 (Miss. 1994) . 
In FSC Securities, the court noted: 
Federal and state courts and other 
jurisdictions have been reluctant to find 
broker-dealers vicariously liable for the 
underhanded dealings of registered 
representatives in circumstances similar to 
the case sub justice. These cases have 
turned on the doctrine of apparent authority. 
Apparent authority is to be determined from 
the acts of the principal and requires 
reliance and good faith on the part of the 
third party. [Citation] ... The first 
element of apparent authority is whether the 
principal knowingly and/or negligently 
permitted their agents to claim they were 
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acting within the scope of their authority. 
This element involves the conduct of the 
principal rather than that of the plaintiff. 
Id. at 17 (emphasis added in). 
In rejecting a claim of apparent authority by plaintiffs, 
the FSC Securities court considered a record which is nearly 
identical to the trial court record here, and stated: 
The McCormacks [plaintiffs] had no contact 
with FSC [the broker-dealer], made no effort 
to follow their investment through FSC and 
relied on and dealt only with Manuel [the 
registered representative] ... 
• * * 
The record clearly indicates that Manuel as 
well as FSC Securities' other registered 
representatives act within the scope of 
employment only when soliciting or 
transacting business in securities approved 
for sale by the broker-dealer. Id. at 18-19. 
This case is completely distinguishable from Horrocks. which 
involved the principal's active involvement, receipt of funds, 
and the knowledge and use of the principal's forms, but is 
indistinguishable from Hauser, Bates, FSC Securities and other 
cases cited by Private Ledger on this issue. Indeed, the Court 
of Appeals Memorandum Decision contradicts its own prior analysis 
of Private Ledger's strict rules and procedures and the 
prohibited practice of "selling away," as set forth in State v. 
Harry, supra, 873 P.2d at 1152. 
The Court of Appeals Decision is clearly unwise precedent 
and a dramatic departure from the sound jurisprudence of other 
jurisdictions. This Court should grant certiorari to correct 
this conflict. This is not a case of conflicting authorities on 
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this issue. There is no reported decision consistent with the 
Court of Appeals Decision here. 
D. The Court Of Appeals Misconstrued The Trial Court's Ruling, 
The Court of Appeals takes issue with the trial court's 
comment that "one cannot be an agent of the principal while at 
the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent 
as to Private Ledger" and states that no authority exists for 
this proposition. [See Appendix, Exhibit "A", p. 1] This 
comment, however, is entirely consistent with the trial court's 
finding that no evidence existed that Private Ledger in any way 
clothed Harry with the apparent authority to sell the Red River 
partnerships and that Harry's actions were so far outside the 
course of his agency that any purported reliance by plaintiffs 
was unreasonable. 
Here, unlike many cases involving criminal activity of an 
agent, the purported agent was criminally convicted not only of 
defrauding the customers, but criminally convicted of defrauding 
Private Ledger as well. State v. Harry, supra. As noted in 
Private Ledger's Appellate Brief, if Private Ledger had any 
knowledge or culpability whatsoever, or had in any way ratified 
or condoned such activities by Harry, that knowledge, 
ratification or conduct would have presented a defense to Harry 
in the criminal case, where he was convicted beyond a reasonable 
doubt of having defrauded Private Ledger. 
/// 
/// 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Private Ledger respectfully 
requests that this Court grant its Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
DATED: August 16, 19 96 Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT LLP 
By: 
r 
2$2gk 
B a i r d "Morgaia 
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correct copies of the foregoing document were hand delivered to: 
J. Michael Coombs 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Randy B. Coke 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
3 33 North 3 00 West 
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Attorneys: Randy B. Coke and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
S. Baird Morgan, Salt Lake City, Michael L. Kirby and 
Jeffrey P. Lendrum, San Diego, California, for 
Appellees 
J. Michael Coombs, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Ronald Harry 
Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion, 
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of 
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order 
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court 
explained that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the 
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as 
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority 
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor 
have defendants called our attention to any such authority. 
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for 
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during 
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent* s 
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat. 892 P.2d 14, 15-16 
(Utah App. 1995); Pouisen v. Treasure State Indus.. Inc., S26 
P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency 
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are 
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the 
clearest cases. Carcrill. Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d 
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kisslincr, 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash. 
App. 1989). Simply because the agent commits an act that is 
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all 
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party. 
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct 
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct 
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the 
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants 
and the scope of Harry's authority. 
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative 
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that 
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest 
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they 
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first 
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otherwise 
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his 
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Lanaford, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1996). See also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App. 
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and 
after the transaction" in question). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial 
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be 
appropriate. 
Gregory E^Orme, Z 
Presidifig Judge 
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ORDER
 J U N 2 1 1996 
Case No. 950238-®A' **** VUONAN*SWEAT 
This matter is before the court upon appellees' petition for 
rehearing, filed May 16, 1996. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this 
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/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION, 
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Defendants. 
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(Bench Ruling) 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
May 17, 1994 
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FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
RANDY B. COKE 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
S. BAIRD MORGAN 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and 
MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT 
701 "B" Street, Suite 1400 
San Diego, CA 92101 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT HARRY: 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH? MAY 17, 1994; A.M. SESSION 
2 (REPORTER'S NOTE: The following is an 
3 excerpt of proceedings in the above-entitled case:) 
4 THE COURT: Thank youf Mr. Kirby. 
5 Dealing with the statute of limitations first, I 
6 think that Mr. Coke has presented an issue of fact 
7 regarding the concealment issue by Mr. Harry and I think 
8 that remains to be an issue of fact in any mind. 
9 More critically, though, is my analysis as to the 
10 matter of law as to whether or not Private Ledger should 
11 be held liable• I have no argument with Mr. Coke when he 
12 states to me the general proposition regarding respondeat 
13 superior, no controlling person. 
14 The question I have is just how far can that be 
15 reached when the defendant in this matter, Private Ledger, 
16 has gone to what I think is more than sufficient steps to 
17 ensure that activities by their registered agent are 
18 pursuant to their policies. 
19 It is apparent that Red River was not an approved 
20 security from Private Ledger, that there was no 
21 authorization from Private Ledger to Mr. Harry to go 
22 beyond that policy. In essencef it appears that when a 
23 registered representative of a brokerage firm clearly 
24 violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized 
25 activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 3 
1 matter, I just cannot see how liability can be imposed 
2 upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter. 
3 It did not appear on Private Ledger statements 
4 regarding the purchase of this. There may have been 
5 indication that money was transferred but that was all 
6 that was done and that knowledge was to the plaintiffs in 
7 this matter. 
8 ' Private Ledger, once again, never approved of the 
9 Red River investment. It did not appear —as I said the 
10 plaintiffs' investments were not run through the Private 
11 Ledger accounts to the extent of appearing on Private 
12 Ledger statements. There had been no fees, no collections 
13 and no prior knowledge of Private Ledger of the activity 
14 of Mr. Harry. 
15 The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
16 defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes ray opinion in that 
17 one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time 
18 engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They 
19 are mutually exclusive actions and terms. 
20 The apparent reliance that Mr. Coke wishes the 
21 court to accept regarding the activities of Messrs. Brgoch 
22 and Isaacs, I do not have to reach the point that they are 
23 sophisticated and/or somehow registered investors by the 
24 fact they have had a long track record with Mr. Harry. 
25 They did, in fact, move from different brokerage firms 
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1 Mr. Harry was employed with. Their reliance, in my 
2 opinion, was on Mr. Harry and just incidentally with the 
3 firm that he was employed by* 
4 I think that in this situation, Private Ledger 
5 has done anything and everything they could to ensure 
6 their registered agents are actually agents of them in 
7 doing what their policies indicate that they are allowed 
8 to do, i.e. trade in approved securities, have commissions 
9 paid pursuant to that, have knowledge of the operations 
10 that the agents are doing in relations to the brokerage 
11 house and the investors, and indicating which ones and 
12 gaining thorough knowledge of activity, then, somehow 
13 ratifying the agent's position in this matter. I find 
14 that has not been done so as a matter of law, I am ruling 
15 for defendant, Private Ledger, regarding their motion for 
16 summary judgment as to the statute of limitations. It 
17 remains to me to be a question of fact to be ferreted out 
18 if, any there be, at trial. 
19 MR. KIRBY: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: With that, Mr. Kirby, Mr. Morgan, 
21 please prepare the appropriate orders in this matter and 
22 submit it to Mr. Coke for his approval prior to submission 
23 to the court for signature. 
24 MR. MORGAN: I will do that, your Honor. 
25 MR. KIRBY: Thank you. 
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1 (REPORTER'S NOTE: Further pretrial 
2 proceedings were had, being reported but not herein 
3 transcribed.) 
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16 any of the parties herein or thedLr counsel, and that I am 
17 not interested in the events thereof. 
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Brcroch v . H a r r y 
S t a t u t e s 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 45 
Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court of 
Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, 
an order, and a decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the 
Court of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46 
Considerations governing review of certiorari, 
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important reasons. The following, while neither 
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the 
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, 
but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
(b) After a Petition for Certiorari has been filed, the 
panel that issued the opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a 
minute entry recommending that the Supreme Court grant the 
petition. Parties shall not request such a recommendation by 
motion or otherwise. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56(e) 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that: there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
